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ACTIONS-MOTIvE AS INFLUENCING SUCCESS In LITIGATION-A salesman,
having arranged to market a product identical to that of the defendant
corporation, persuaded the plaintiff, a substantial stockholder, to bring a
bill alleging corruption and demanding an accounting. There was evidence
that the sole purpose of the action was to destroy the defendant corpora-
tion and so eliminate competition. Held, that the improper motive of the
action warranted dismissal of the bill. Johnson -v. King-Richardson Co.,
28 F. (2d) 192 (D. Mass. 1928).
It has been asserted both at law and in equity that motive is immaterial
in determining whether or not a right or a privilege exists. Karenins v.
31. P. Ass'n, 65 Utah 183, 235 Pac. 880 (1925); In -re Stlly, 152 Fed. 619
(C. C. A. 2d, 1907); see (1909) 19 BENCH AND BAR 106. But there is
authority to the contrary. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Blinn. 145, 119 N. W. 946
(1909) (banker enjoined, on ground of bad motive, from carrying on com-
peting barber shop); American Bank & Trust Co. v,. Fed. Res. Ban: of
Atlanta, 256 U. S. 350, 41 Sup. Ct. 499 (1921) (privilege of bank to
accumulate checks for unreasonable time for purpose of coercing plaintiff
denied); of. (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1166. In the absence of statute, motive
is a controlling factor in determining whether a shareholder has a right
to the inspection of the corporate books. In ve Coats, 73 App. Div. 178,
76 N. Y. Supp. 730 (1st Dep't 1902) ("wrecker" attempting to gain con-
trol); Day & Co. v. Booth, 123 Me. 443, 123 At. 557, 43 A. L. R. 780
(1924) (mandamus denied broker who sought list for mailing purposes);
see (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 541. If a shareholder sues the corporation to
further the purposes of others the bill will be dismissed without regard
to its other merits. Waterbury v. Merchantc Union Exp. Co., 50 Barb.
157 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1867) (shareholder acting for competitor denied decree
dissolving express company and appointing receiver); Belmont v. Erie
By., 52 Barb. 637 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1869) (motion to open order appointing
receiver and enjoining increase in capital granted on ground plaintiff was
puppet for financial backers hostile to the defendant) ; Camblos v. P. & R. .,
4 Brewst. 563 (Pa. 1873) (injunction to restrain corporation from carry-
ing on business competitive to real party in interest denied). Shareholders
suing to accomplish their own selfish purposes, not germane to their in-
terests as such, or inimical to the corporation, have been equally unsuccess-
ful. Beshoar v. Chappell, 6 Colo. App. 323, 40 Pac. 244 (1895) (suit to gain
control and assist competitor); Sparhak v. Union Pass. Ry., 54 Pa. 401
(1867) (attempt to enforce Sunday blue laws by shareholder's suit to
prevent corporation violating charter) ; Forrest v. Manchester Ry., 4 De G.
F. & J. 126 (1861). But when suit was brought in good faith the plaintiff
has recovered although financed for selfish motives by a competitor of the
defendant. Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v,. Latta & Harpcr, 193
S. W. 1115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). But see Belmont v. Eric By., Itpra
at 663. In the instant case it would seem that the court properly con-
sidered the plaintiff's motive in determining that he had no right of action.
MkLIENS-NATUALIZATION-BELIEFS OF APPLICANT-REFUSAL TO BFm
ARLs.--An alien woman fifty years old, on applying for naturalization,
declared her unwillingness to take up arms in defense of the country,
though she was willing to take the oath to "support and defend the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States" Her petition for citizenship was
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denied. Held, on appeal, that the views of the applicant on such a hypo-
thetical question were immaterial. Decree reversed. Schwiminer v. Unitcd
States, 27 F. (2d) 742 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928).
An applicant for citizenship must by statute be "attached to the principles
of the Constitution," and must swear to "support and defend" it. 34
STAT. 597, 598 (1906), 8 U. S. C. §§ 381, 382 (1926). Ignorance of the
Constitution and of American institutions may show a lack of attach-
ment. In 'e Goldberg, 269 Fed. 392 (E. D. Mo. 1920). A belief in a
social system opposed to that of the American Constitution may likewise
bar naturalization, or allow cancellation of naturalization on the ground
of fraud. Ex parte Sauer, 81 Fed. 355 (D. C. Tex. 1891) (socialist);
United States v. Olsson, 196 Fed. 562 (W. D. Wash. 1912) (believer in
community property); In re Olson, 4 F. (2d) 417 (W. D. Wash. 1925)
(member of I. W.. W. and believer in anarchism); (1925) 73 U. oF PA.
L. REV. 434; of. Bronaugh, Exelusion of Aliens Because of Anarchistio
Belief (1925) 29 LAw NoTEs 106. But a mere advocacy of changes in
the Constitution, which itself provides for change, does not show that
naturalization was procured by fraud. United States v. Rovin, 12 F. (2d)
942 (E. D. Mich. 1926). A claim of exemption from the military draft
as an alien may later bar naturalization, as evidence of a lack of attach-
ment to the Constitution. In re Shanin, 278 Fed. 739 (D. Mass. 1922);
O'Brien, A Current Problem of Naturalization (1925) 9 MARQ. L. RIv.
270; (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 548. Such a claim on the ground of conscientious
objections to fighting, continuing after the war, has been held to prevent
naturalization. In re D-, 290 Fed. 863 (N. D. Ohio, 1923). Mere expres-
sions of unwillingness to bear arms on the part of male applicants bar
applications, as showing that the oath cannot be taken without mental
reservations. In re Roeper, 274 Fed. 490 (D. Del. 1921) ; State v. Distrioe
Court, 61 Mont. 427, 202 Pac. 387 (1921). The instant case seems a
reasonable exception to this rule, in view of the extreme improbability of
the applicant's views having a practical significance.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-POWER OF LEGISLATURES TO Fix PRICES.-A Ten-
nessee statute provided for the fixing of prices at which gasoline might
be sold within that state. Tenn. Acts 1927, c. 22. The prices were to be
fixed by the Commissioner of Finance and Taxation after a due investiga-
tion by a Division of Motors and Motor Fuels created in the Department
of Finance and Taxation. A general statute made a violation of the
act a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment. TENN. CODn
(Shinnon, 1918) § 6437. The plaintiffs brought suit in the federal district
court to enjoin the enforcement of the act and to have it declared uncon-
stitutional. The district court granted the injunction and held the act
unconstitutional. Held, on appeal (one justice dissenting), that the statute
was unconstitutional on the ground that the right of a vendor to fix
the price of his commodity is properly within the protection of the four-
teenth amendment. Williams w. Standard Oil Co. of La., 49 Sup. Ct. 115
(U. S. 1929).
The right of buyers and sellers to fix prices by the competitive process
has been held to be within the protection of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427 (1897) ;
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923) ; Fair.
miont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 506 (1927).
The legislature has power to fix the prices at which goods may be sold,
services rendered, or property used, only when: (1) such business or
property is dedicated to "a public use," such as public utilities where the
puiNic has a right to demand service; (2) the business is one of the historic
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public callings such as inns, cabs, and gristmills; or (3) the business
is "affected with a public interest." See Wolf Co. v. Indistrial Court,
262 U. S. 522, 535, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 632 (192-3). Decisions under the last
category cannot yet be reduced to an all-inclusive standard of what is
"affected with a public interest." It has been suggested that the real
basis for allowing legislative price fixing is the failure of the competitive
system adequately to protect the public. See Ribkcl: ,. McBride, 277
U. S. 350, 360, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 547 (1928); Comment (1928) 38 YALE,
I,. J. 225, 232; HALE, TREND OF ECONomicS (1924) 214. But as yet we
have no exact quantitative test of the curtailment of the regulative force
of competition. The courts are more ready to uphold legislative price
fixing of necessities than of luxuries. Marcus Brozrn v. Feldman, 250 U. S.
170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (1921); cf. Tyson -e. Bantonz, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup.
Ct. 426 (1926). Where the price of a commodity cannot be fixed by the
"higgling of the market," regulation is allowed. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113 (1876) (fixing charges of grain elevators); Brass v. Stocscr, 153
U. S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct. 857 (1894) scmible. The efficacy of the competitive
system depends on equality of bargaining power; and where this equality
does not exist regulation has been, allowed. Griffith v. Connecticut, 218
U. S. 563, 31 Sup. Ct. 132 (1910) (statute fixing maximum rate of interest
chargeable on loans); Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U. S. 540, 45 Sup. Ct. 399
(1925) (statute fixing fees charged by attorneys representing injured
employees before workmen's compensation commissions). Contra: Ribnicl:
v. McBride, supra; Alsup z. State, 10 S. W. (2d) 9 (Ark. 1928) (statutes
regulating fees charged by employment agencies held invalid). In the
instant case it is not clear that the competitive system has failed to per-
form its regulatory function in the gasoline industry.
CORPORATIONS-STATUTORY REsPoNsmrLTY OF SI=HoLDrs-NEc rr."
OF EXHAUSTING REMEDIES AGAINST CORPoPRTIoN.-The plaintiff obtained
a judgment for $38,275 against a traction company for injuries caused
by a street car. While an appeal was pending, she brought the instant
action against the defendant as sole shareholder of the traction company
and obtained a verdict for $118,000, judgment being stayed. The appeal
in the prior suit was dismissed, and the traction company tendered full
payment of the prior judgment, which the plaintiff refused. Judgment
was entered in the instant suit limited to the amount of the prior judgment.
Held, on appeal, that the judgment be increased to $118,000 on the theory
that a shareholder's responsibility is primary and independent of the cor-
poration's responsibility. M2dler v. Coast Counties Gas & Electric Co., 271
Pac. 338 (Cal. 1928).
The statutes of California and a few other states do not expressly make
the exhaustion of remedies against the corporation a prerequisite to the
shareholder's statutory responsibility to corporate creditors. Cf. CAI. CrVI,
CODE (Deering, 1923) § 322. The California courts have not read this
requirement into the statute and the instant case follows their view that
the shareholder's responsibility is primary. Morrow v. Superior Court,
64 Cal. 383, 1 Pac. 354 (1883); Fry v. Baltimore Hotel Co., 80 Cal. App.
415, 252 Pac. 752 (1926). Under similar statutes, other courts have re-
quired creditors to proceed first against the corporation. Ladd v. Cart-
2vr ght, 7 Ore. 329 (1879); Duke v. Johnson, 123 Wash. 43, 211 Pac. 710
(1923); Ewing v. Stultz, 9 Ind. App. 1, 36 N. E. 170 (1894); see Finmel
v. Bane, 93 W. Va. 697, 703, 117 S. E. 549, 551 (1923). Under most statutt,,
after exhausting his remedies against the corporation a creditor mayproct il
against any shareholder. 7 FLErcRnn, Cyc. CORP. (1919) § 4218. Bdt
it is generally held unnecessary to proceed against the corporation if it
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is insolvent. Drennan v. Jenkins, 180 Ala. 261, 60 So. 856 (1913); Obrien
Mercantile Co. v. Growers Ass'n, 173 Minn. 493, 217 N. W. 940 (1928);
Rohr v. Stanton, 78 Mont. 494, 254 Pac. 869 (1927). Contra: Ball v.
Wicks, 45 Neb. 367, 63 N. W. 806 (1895); Wegner v. Tower, 235 Mich.
610, 209 N. W. 802 (1926). Some state statutes require the action to
be brought in equity on lehalf of all creditors with the corporation and
all stockholders within the jurisdiction joined as defendants. ILL. REV.
STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 32, § 53. Other courts have adopted this pro-
cedure through judicial enactment. Ladd v. Cartwright, supra; Duke v.
Johnson, supra; Bottlers Seal Co. v. Rainey, 243 N. Y. 333, 153 N. E.
437 (1926); (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 97.
CORPORATIONS-TAxATION OF DIVIDENDS APPLIED TO THE PAYMENT OF
NEw SHAns.-In 1920 a Massachusetts corporation authorized a further
issue of shares. The new shares were to be paid for out of the not earn-
ings of the corporation. The plaintiff, a shareholder, gave his note as
security for payment for his allotment of shares. In 1921 the directors
declared a dividend equivalent to five dollars per share, which was to
be considered as part payment for these additional shares. In his income
tax return the plaintiff paid under protest the surtax computed on the
amount of dividends he received. Held, that this was a stock dividend
and therefore, for purposes of taxation, the plaintiff had received no
income. Teehan v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 884 (D. Mass. 1928).
A stock dividend does not constitute taxable income. Eisner v. Macomber,
252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189 (1920). Contra: Tax Commissioner v.
Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 116 N. E. 904 (1917); State v. Nygaard, 174
Wis. 597, 183 N. W. 884 (1921) ; cf. Maggs, Computation of Income (1924)
13 CALIF. L. REV. 13. When it is obvious from the facts that it was
the intent of a corporation to declare a stock rather than a cash dividend,
the court will look beyond the form of the transaction. Michaels v,. Mc-
Laughlin, 20 F. (2d) 959 (D. Cal. 1927) (corporation transferring surplus
from "profit and loss" account to capital account and thereby causing
shares 80% paid up to become fully paid up held to have given share-
holders no taxable income); United States v. Mellon, 281 Fed. 645 (C. C. A.
3d, 1922) (corporation offering one share without cost with each new
share purchased in order to get new capital held to have given a stock
dividend); Rand v. Hubbell, 115 Mass. 461 (1874) (corporation declaring
cash dividend just sufficient to pay for new shares, and to be applied
therefor, held to have given a stock dividend). A stock dividend to share-
holders seems clearly to have been the ultimate purpose of the corporation's
scheme in the instant case. The obligations of the promissory notes were
.to be extinguished by subsequent dividends, and merely secured the cor-
poration in event of inability to declare such dividends. Cf. Michaels v.
McLaughlin, supra. But ef. A. R. R. 1127, 1-2 Cum. Bull. 8. But previoun
Internal Revenue rulings have been to the effect that such dividends are
taxable income. L T. 1740, 11-2 Cum. Bull. 82; ef. Appeal of Hunt, 5
B. T. A. 356. It therefore seems likely that action by some higher federal
court will be necessary to settle the question.
DAmAGES-ANTICIPATORY REruDIATION BY BUYER or GOODS TO BE MANIT-
FACTURED-MITIGATION OF DAMAGES.-The plaintiff, a manufacturer of iron,
contracted to sell to the defendant 200 tons, deliveries to be mada "about
vtually over the first half of 1921." In face of a rapidly falling market,
" buyer repudiated before performance was due. The plaintiff was con-
icantly manufacturing and making sales of the product. No particular
iron was-.appropriated to the contract. The court instructed the jury
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that the measure of damages was the difference between the contract price
and the market price at the time when deliveries should have been made
unless "there was something that the plaintiff might have done to lezsen
or minimize the damages, such as making forward contracts or disposing
of the goods." The jury's award was evidently based on a finding that
the plaintiff should have resold the iron about the time of repudiation.
Held, on appeal by the plaintiff, that the judgment be affirmed. Cralle
I-roa Works v. Co.. & Sons Co., 28 F. (2d) 328 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923).
The general rule that in case of an anticipatory breach of a contract
the damages are based on the cost or value of performance at the time
fixed by the contract for that performance, not at time of breach, is
affirmed, with respect to a buyer's refusal to accept the goods, by the
provision of the Sales Act declaring that the measure of damages is "the
difference between the contract price and the market or current price at
the time or times when the goods ought to have been accepted." U.NIForm
SALES Acr § 64 (3); 2 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1921) § 5ST; cf. S-gall
v. Finlay, 245 N. Y. 61, 156 N. E. 97 (1927) (anticipatory breach by
seller). But this section seems to contemplate specified goods. Where
goods to be manufactured have not yet been substantially completed, the
rule of damages as the difference between the contract price and the cost
of manufacturing and putting the goods into a deliverable state still
obtains. Devoine Co. v. Intcrnational Co., 151 Md. 690, 136 Atl. 37 (1927) ;
Holston Box & Lumber Co. -v. Vondberg & Bates, 34 Ga. App. 298, 129
S. E. 562 (1925). But whichever test is applied, if something remains
to be done by the seller, he will be unable to recover greater damages
than he "would have suffered if he did nothing towards carrying out
the contract or the sale after receiving notice of the buyer's repudiation
or countermand." UWIS!Or SALES AcT § 64 (4); Edgar & Son v. Grocero'
Wholesale Co., 298 Fed. 878 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924). This is the only clause
.in the Sales Act based on the doctrine of mitigation of damages. But,
as the instant case correctly states, the general rule which entitles the
repudiator to the benefit of any contract of the injured party which could
not rightfully have been made but for the repudiation, has not been
abrogated by implication. See Nestler 9,. Pure Silk Ho.iery Mills, 212
Ill. App. 151, 164-165 (1926) ("no evidence that plaintiff could have
mitigated"). So, -where the quantity called for by the contract would ex-
haust the manufacturer's output, his damages on repudiation by the buyer
are mitigated by the taking of the output by a third party. Harrington-
Wiard Co. v. Bloomstrom Co., 166 Mich. 276, 131 N. W. 559 (1911).
But where the output is so large that sales can be made to others without
reference to the particular contract breached, the seller is entitled to the
full profit of every contract he can secure. Hollcrback & May v. Wilhins,
130 Ky. 51, 112 S. W. 1126 (1908); Owcnsboro Shovel & Tool Co. v. Moorc,
.154 Ky. 431, 157 S. W. 1121 (1913). If the market price in the intant
case-descended below the cost of manufacture, the market value test would
have given the seller more than purely compensatory damages had not
the doctrine of mitigation of damages been introduced to reduce the re-
covery. But in view of the absence of any showing that sales to third
-parties could not have been made but for the buyer's repudiation, this
doctrine was inappropriately applied. The injured party zhould be placed
in the same position as though the contract had been fulfilled. Cf. UNi-
-onx SALES AcT § 64 (2). It is submitted that the difference between the
contract price and the cost of manufacture would have been a more proper
recovery.
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: EMINENT DOMAIN-COMPENSATION FOR DEPRIVATION OF PRVILOEG TO
BuILD.-A city passed an ordinance providing for the widening of a street,
and declaring the erection or alteration of any building without receding
to the new line unlawful. The plaintiff wished to build on his entire
lot but a permit was refused. The new line left him too small a plot on
which to build. The plaintiff instituted proceedings to have viewers
appointed to assess his damages. The lower court dismissed the petition
on the ground that there had been no "taking of property," insomuch as
the ordinance fixing the time for the assessment of damages had not yet
been passed. Held, on appeal, that there had been a "taking or injuring
of property" within the constitutional provision. Judgment reversed. It
re Sansom Street, 143 Atl. 134 (Pa. 1928).
The Pennsylvania Constitution, in common with a few other state con-
stitutions, provides expressly that municipal corporations shall compensate
for property "taken, injured, or destroyed." PA. CONST. ART. XVI, § 8;
ALA. CONST. 235; S. D. CONST. ART. XVII, § 18. Many other constitutions
provide in general terms for compensation when property is "taken or
damaged." ILL. CONST. ART. II, § 13; VA. CONST. ART. IV, § 58. Under
these provisions, it would seem clear that compensation should be allowed
under the facts of the instant case, since a denial of the privilege to build
on the land is clearly a damage to it. Many constitutions, however, only
provide for compensation for properly "taken." U. S. CONST. AMEND. V;
CONN. CONST. ART. I, § 11; N. Y. CONST. ART. I, § 6. Under such provisions,
the early tendency was to hold that only total physical appropriation con-
stituted a taking. Livermore v. Jamaica, 23 Vt. 361 (1851); SEaWICK,
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1874) 454 et seq.; 1 LEWIS,
EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1909) § 66 et seq. The courts did not recognize
"consequential damages" as a taking. Radcliff's Ex'rs v. Mayor of Brook-
lyn, 4 N. Y. 195 (1850) ; City of Valparaiso v. Hagin, 153 Ind. 337, 54 N. E.
1062 (1899); Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 417 (Mass, 1823). The more
modern view in those states which have not broadened the constitutional
provision, however, does not require physical appropriation, and a depriva-
tion of an important interest which an owner has in the land will be
considered a taking. Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327,
43 Sup. Ct. 135 (1922) (allegation of firing cannon across land adjoining
hotel held sufficient); 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1911) § 110;
(1927) 13 VA. L. REv. 334. So in the instant case the decision might
well have been the same under a constitutional provision providing
merely for "taking," since the privilege to build was the most valuable
interest the owner had in this particular land.
EVIDENCE-IMPEACHING ONE'S OWN WITNESS-PRIOR INCONSISTENT
STATEMENTS.-Three prisoners signed a joint statement implicating the
defendant as accomplice in a mail robbery. On the stand, one witness
failed to identify the defendant. On a claim of "surprise," the government
was permitted to prove the previous statement by other witnesses. The
other two prisoners were then called. Both testified as the first prisoner
and were subjected to cross-examination and impeachment in the same
manner. The defendant was convicted. Held, on appeal, that the impeach-
ment of the latter two prisoners was improper. The joint statement was
a fair warning to the government that they would pursue the same course
*as the first prisoner and bdrred 'a claim of surprise as to them. Thus the
impeaching testirmony was incompetent. Furthermore, under the circum-
stances it was prejudicial. Judgment of conviction reversed. Sullivan V.
United States, 28 F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928).
In most jurisdictions in order to impeach one's own witness on the ground
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of "surprise," the party must have been "misled" or "entrapped" into
offering the witness. Dauber r. Joscpleson, 209 Mo. App. 531, 237 S. IV.
149 (1922); Burns v. State, 92 S. E. 548 (Ga. App. 1917); State r.
Treseder, 66 Utah 543, 244 Pac. 654 (1926). A previous contradictory
statement made directly to a party or his attorney usually constitutes "sur-
prise" allowing impeachment. People v. Deckcrt, 77 Cal. App. 146, 246
Pac. 157 (1926); State v. Swigcr, 143 S. E. 85 (W. Va. 1928). But not
where it is known beforehand that the witness will decline to testify as
desired. Bztcher r. State, 104 Tex. Cr. 464, 284 S. W. 219 (1926). Cf.
People v. Ainort, 60 Cal. App. 29, 212 Pac. 50 (1922); see also, Kuhn r.
United States, 24 F. (2d) 910, 913 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928) (reason so
to believe). Moreover the testimony must be affirmatively harmful; mere
disappointment in eliciting desired information is not sufficient. State v.
Walters, 145 La. 209, 82 So. 197 (1919); Sneed v. Unitcd Stateso, 298 Fd.
911 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924) ; (1924) 34 YA=E L. J. 214. Thus, in a prosecution
for rape or seduction, the denial of a witness that he had intercourse with
the prosecutrix would not justify the defendant in impeaching him. State
v. Drmnmins, 274 Mo. 632, 204 S. W. 271 (1918); Richcrsoz v. State, 100
Ga. 391, 33 S. E. 639 (1898). But the failure of a witness to identify an
accomplice is usually considered affirmatively harmful. Siaith v. United
States, 17 F. (2d) 223 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1926); State v. Ungcr, 103 N.
J. L. 18, 134 Atl. 886 (1926). The impeaching evidence must be offered
purely to discredit the statement of the witness on the stand and not as
a means of introducing substantive testimony otherwise inadmissible. Par-
ker v. State, 196 Ind. 534, 149 N. E. 59 (1925); People v. Spencer, 80 Cal.
-p15. 197, 208 Pac. 380 (1922). It might seem possible to have based the
reversal in the instant case, not on the ground of lack of "surprise," but
on that of insufficient evidence to warrant a verdict. As to "surprise," it
is submitted that if it be required it should be found on slight grounds,
especially in view of modern criticism aimed at the whole rule against im-
peaching one's own witness. 2 WIG0oRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 896
et seq. 904; Porterfield, Witnesses (1928) 34 W. VA. L. Q. 30G.
FUTuRE INTERESTS-GrFT CONTAINED IN DIRECTION To DIuDE AND PAY
OVER-VESTED oR ExEcUTory.-The testator devised the residue of his
estate, personal and real, to trustees to manage and pay the income to A, B,
C, and D in specified proportions, with substituted gifts in case of the death
of any beneficiary. Ten years after the testator's death the trustees were
to sell the trust property and divide the proceeds among the above bene-
ficiaries in the same proportions and with the same substituted gifts as
applied to the distribution of the income, plus the contingency that in the
event of the decease of all four beneficiaries then to their children per
capita and not per stirpes. During the ten-year period, B and C were also
to have the free use of certain of the trust property in addition to their
incomes. A became bankrupt after the testator's death, but before the
end of the ten-year period. The trustees in bankruptcy sought a deter-
mination of A's interest in the corpus of the trust fund. Held, on case
reserved, that A had a vested interest, which passed to the trustees in
bankruptcy. Gaffney v. Shepard, 143 Atl. 236 (Conn. 1928).
Vested interests, rather than contingent interests, are presumed where
consistent with the testator's intention. First National Bank of Bridgeport
v. Somers, 106 Conn. 267, 137 Atl. 737 (1927); 2 PAGE, WiLLs (2d ed.
1926) §§ 1110-1117. If the only words of gift are contained in the direc-
tion to trustees to divide and pay over at a future time, the gift is
Suture, not immediate. Matter of Crane, 164 N. Y. 71, 58 N. E. 47 (1900);
In r Kountz's Estate, 213 Pa. 390, 62 Atl. 1103 (1906). Where a post-
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poned gift of money is found only in a direction to convert the estate
and distribute the proceeds, the legacy given to a class vests in those
answering the description at the time of distribution. Matter of Baer,
147 N. Y. 348, 41 N. E. 702 (1895); Lewisohn v. Henry, 179 N. Y. 352,
72 N. E. 239 (1904). If the payment is merely postponed until tho
termination of an intermediate estate, the interest is declared vested at
the testator's death and the class determined as of that date. Martin v.
Cook, 129 Md. 195, 98 Atl. 489 (1916). When an examination of the
entire will is said to reveal the apparent intention of the testator that
the estate should vest upon his death, it will be deemed to vest at that
time. Matter of Crane, supra. But in the instant case the class of bene-
ficiaries to whom the corpus is given, including as it does a possible gift to
all grandchildren per capita, may not be the same as that class to receive
the income during the ten-year period. The application of the divide
and pay over rule as one of construction has been adversely criticized.
See Camman v. Bailey, 210 N. Y. 19, 33, 103 N. E. 824, 828 (1913);
White v. Smith, 87 Conn. 663, 668, 89 Atl. 272, 274 (1914); of. Glucic, The
Divide and Pay Over Rule in New York (1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 8. The gift
of the whole income of a postponed legacy is generally/ construed to vest
in the beneficiary the principal from which the income is derived. Steinway
v. Steinway, 163 N. Y. 183, 57 N. E. 312 (1900); see In re Edwards'
Estate, 255 Pa. 358, 363, 99 Atl. 1010, 1011 (1916). But it is apparent
in the instant case that the income and principal were not apportioned
exactly alike, as B and C received the free use of certain trust property
which the other beneficiaries did not, and the income distributed therefore
was not derived from all of the trust property. An imperative power of
future sale in the trustee ordinarily indicates a postponed vesting, although
if the will is construed to disclose a different intention, it will be respected.
Matter of Brown, 154 N. Y. 313, 48 N. E. 537 (1897). While the decision
in the instant case appears to be in harmony with some recent Connecticut
precedents, it is submitted that the gift should be considered an executory
devise. An executory interest does not pass to an assignee in.bankruptcy.
Bristol v. Atwater, 50 Conn. 402 (1882).
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION-GROUND FOR SETTING AsmaD-I .aALITY
OR INSUFFICIENCY OF EvIDENcE .Following a search and seizure under
an illegal warrant the defendant was indicted for unlawfully possessing
and selling intoxicating liquor. Upon motion the search warrant was
quashed and the evidence obtained thereunder suppressed. As to the indict-
ment, held, that it be sustained, since it did not appear that the evidence
before the grhnd jury, exclusive of that suppressed, was insufficient. United
States v. Harbin, 27 F. (2d) 892 (N. D. Miss. 1928).
When courts inquire into the evidence before the grand jury an indict-
ment will be set aside if it is not supported by some legal evidence. State
v. Ivey, 100 N. C. 639 (1888). But an indictment will not be set aside
merely because some illegal evidence was heard. People v. Walburn, 159
N. Y. Supp. 185 (Sup. Ct. 1916). And when there is legal evidence it4
sufficiency will not be considered. Gore v. State, 114 So. 791, cert. denied,
114 So. 794 (Ala. 1927). Otlierwise, it is said, the judgment of the court
would be substituted for that of the grand jury. See People v. Buffalo
Gravel Corp., 195 N. Y. Supp. 940, 945 (Sup. Ct. 1922). Some courts
have refused to make any inquiry whatsoever into the evidence before
the grand jury. Lee v. State, 148 S. W. 567 (Tex. Cr. App. 1912). So,
too, although a statute stipulatds that the grand jury shall receive only
legal evidence. '-Murphy -v.'State, 171 Ak. 620, 286 S. W. 871 (1926);
State v. Chance, 29 N. M. 34, 221 Pac. 183' (1923). Contra: People v.
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Walburn, supra. The reason often given is that illegality or insufficiency
of the evidence before the grand jury is not included in the statute enum-
erating the grounds on which an indictment may be set aside. People v.
Collins, 60 Cal. App. 263, 212 Pac. 701 (1922). Whether or not inquiry
be made, evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure is of the same
effect as other illegal evidence. State v. Fodl, 37 Idaho 722, 217 Pac.
603 (1923) (inquiry refused). But a violation of the accused's privilege
against self-incrimination is variously regarded. People v. Bc;7,zel, 71
Misc. 356, 128 N. Y. Supp. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1911) ground per se for setting
aside indictment); State v. Lloyd, 152 Wis. 24, 139 N. W. 514 (1913)
(information sustained on other evidence) ; Meneheca v. State, 28. S. IV.
203 (Tex. Cr. App. 1894) (inquiry refused notwithstanding). Any inquiry
into the evidence before the grand jury appears merely to give the guilty
a tactical advantage, acquainting them in advance of the case against
them.
INSURANC--PREAIUMS PAID WHILE INSOLVENT-kIGHTS OF CzrIOns.-
The insured, while residing in Ohio, took out a life insurance policy for the
benefit of his wife, and paid premiums thereon. He later moved to New
York with his wife, and continued paying premiums in New York until his
death, he being insolvent. His administrator sued his wife for the benefit
of his creditors. Judgment was given for the defendant. Held, on appeal
(two judges dissenting), that the creditors were entitled under N. Y.
DonmEsTi RELAsTiNs LAw (1909) § 52 to insurance purchased by the prc-
miums in excess of $500 per year, while the insolvent decedent wus a resident
of New York. Judgment reversed. Uvited States Mortgage & Trust Co. v.
Ruggles, 224 App. Div. 504, 231 N. Y. Supp. 100 (1st Dep't 1928).
In the absence of statute, the proceeds of a life insurance policy tahen
out by an insolvent debtor for his wife's benefit and the amount paid in
premiums thereon have generally been held exempt from claims of creditors.
Central Bank v. Hurne, 128 U. S. 195, 9 Sup. Ct. 41 (1838); Masonic Mt.
Life Ass'n v. Paisley, 111 Fed. 32 (W. D. Pa. 1901). But see Williston,
Can an Insolvent Debtor Insure His Life for the Boeefit of his Wife? (1391)
25 km. L. REv. 135. But some courts allow creditors to recover the pro-
ceeds according to the ratio the amount of prendums paid after insolvency
bears to the whole sum of premiums paid. Me &chant.s  Mincr. Tranns-
partation Co. v. Borland, 53 N. J. Eq. 282, 31 Atl. 272 (1895); Fearnz v.
Ward, 80 Ala. 555, 2 So. 114 (1887). Other courts allow creditors to re
cover only the amount of the premiums paid after insolvency. Stfglcr'
Ex'x v. Stigler, 77 Va. 163 (1883); Stokes v. Coffee, S Bush. 533 (Ky. 1871).
In the instant case, the insurance money, by the Ohio statute, was free
from all claims of creditors. OHmO Gn.N. CODE (Page, 1926) § 9391. When
the policy was taken out in Ohio and the first premium paid there, the bene-
ficiary obtained a vested right. United States Casualty Co. v. Kaccr, 169
Mlo. 301, 69 S. W. 370 (1902). And the contract of insurance is generally
considered an entire contract. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Stathmi,, 93 U. S.
24 (1876). But the entirety of the contract does not necessarily fix the
beneficiary's right to the whole proceeds; that right becomes fixed only upon
payment of the whole consideration agreed upon, i. e., all the premiums that
became payable. The premiums paid constitute the fund which is to be
traced into the proceeds of the policy and apportioned in the ratio of con-
tributions made to it. Thus where misappropriated money is used to pay
a portion of the premiums, the beneficiary and defrauded party share pro
rata in the proceeds. Varlander v. Keyes, 1 F. (2d) 07 (C. C. A. Sth,
1924); Truelsch v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 180 Wis. 239, 202
N. W. 352 (1925); see (1925) 35 YATX L. J. 220, 222. And the New York
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statute, attaching only to premiums paid by the insured in New York would
seem not to impair any rights acquired under the Ohio contract.
INSURANCF--EFORMATION OF PoLmcY.-The plaintiff was insured with
the defendant against loss of jewelry in the possession of two named
salesmen. The policy was to expire May first. On April 13th, the
plaintiff requested that a rider be attached to the current policy extend-
ing coverage to jewelry in the possession of a third salesman. On April
17th, the defendant wrote accepting the application for renewal and spe-
cifically mentioned that it covered the original two named men. On April
20th, the defendant issued the requested rider. On May 8th, the new policy
was received by the plaintiff, covering only the original two men. A few
days later jewelry was stolen from the third salesman. The plaintiff
obtained reformation of the policy in the lower court, which the appellate
court reversed. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed. Lewitt
& Co. v. Jewelers Safety Fund Soc., 249 N. Y. 217, 164 N. E. 29 (1928).
If an insurance policy, by mutual mistake, or by fraud of one party
and mistake by the other, does not express the true agreement of the
parties, the injured party may have the instrument reformed and recover
thereon. Back v. Peoples Fire Ins. Co., 97 Conn. 336, 116 Atl. 603 (1922);
Sykes v. Life Ins. Co., 148 N. C. 13, 61 S. E. 610 (1908). Thus an
insurer cannot escape an accepted risk by issuing a policy not covering
that risk, or which contains a clause of avoidance for some fact of which
the company had knowledge. Journal Co. v. General Assurance Go., 188
'Wis. 140, 205 N. W. 800 (1925) (policy omitted part of risk); Brodic v.
Atlas Assurance Co., 158 La. 695, 104 So. 620 (1925) (policy required
sole ownership of property by insured, which insurer knew did not exist).
The authority of the insurance agent to bind the company by his knowledge
or contract so that the minds of the parties can be said to have met, is
subject to many distinctions, and the conflict can only be indicated here.
Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Hinton, 116 Miss. 754, 77 So. 652 (1918) (general
agent binds company); Robinson v. Union Auto Ins. Co., 112 Neb. 32,
198 N. W. 166 (1924) (soliciting agent binds company). Contra: Sardo
.'. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 100 N. J. Eq. 332, 134 Atl. 774 (1926). An
agreement for renewal is presumed to be upon the terms of the old policy
if nothing is said to the contrary. Greenlaw v. Fire Ins. Co., 117 Me. 514,
105 Atl. 110 (1918); Hay v. Star Fire Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 236 (1879). In
the instant case the court considered the old policy as of the date of expira-
tion, thus including the rider attached subsequent to the actual renewal
agreement. When a case for reformation exists, acceptance of and failure
to read the policy by the insured does not preclude this relief. Fidelity
& Casualty Co. v. Palmer, 91 Conn. 410, 99 Atl. 1052 (1917); Robinson
v,. Union Auto Ins. Co., supra. But if some additional fact exists which
might reasonably carry notice that the policy varies from the one applied
for, failure to investigate the policy may bar reformation. Bostwick v.
Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 392, 89 N. W. 538 (1902) (letter accompanying policy).
So the defendant's written acceptance of the renewal application which
specifically stated that the renewal covered the original two named sales-
men might have been regarded as notice, if it were not for the fact that
the rider including the third salesman was issued after the date of the
letter.
JOINT TENANCY-CREATION BY CONVEYANCE BETWEEN HUSBAND AND
WIE.--The owner of real estate conveyed it to herself and her husband
to hold "not in tenancy in common, but as joint tenants." After the wife's
RECENT CASE NOTES
death the husband contracted for a sale of the property. The purchasers
refused to accept title until confirmed by decree of a court of equity. The
title was duly confirmed. Held, on appeal, that the estate created vms a
tenancy in common. Decree reversed. Deslau-iers v. Stnesac, 163 N. E.
327 (fll. 1928).
The properties of a joint estate are said to be derived from a fourfold
unity of interest, title, time and possession. 2 Br. Co-.Iz . *180. The usual
mode of creating in a husband and wife a joint tenancy in the separate
property of one was by conveyance to a third party who reconveyed to both
for that purpose. 2 KENT, Co I. *11 2 ; Yozazg v. Brown, 136 Tenn. 184,
188 S. W. 1149 (1916). This formality failing in the instant case the court
could find no unities of time and title. The question has arisen most often
where the expressed intent was to create an estate by the entirety, essen-
tially a joint estate, with the difference that survivorship cannot be defeated
by either spouse. 1 TFFA.qY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 645. Where
there is a direct conveyance of a one-half interest to the other, or of the
whole to both, with a declaration of the kind of estate intended to be
created, the courts have reached various results. By one view a tenancy
in common is created in both instances. Pegg v. Pegg, 165 Mich. 183, 110
N. W. 617 (1911) (half interest to other); Wrg ht v. Kn app, 183 Mich. 656,
150 N. W. 315 (1915) (to both "jointly"). A second is that a conveyance
by one spouse to both amounts to a conveyance to the other of a one-half
interest with a remainder in the other half, subject to the grantor's
debts. Dutton v. Buckley, 116 Ore. 661, 242 Pac. 626 (1926). By a third
view the grantor being unable to take as a grantee, where the conveyance is
to both, the other spouse takes the whole estate. Hicks v. Sprande, 149
Tenn, 310, 257 S. W. 1044 (1924). The fourth, and it is submitted, the most
desirable, view, by refusing to countenance the objection that one cannot
convey to himself, permits the creation of joint estates and estates by en-
tirety in situations similar to that of the instant case, allowing the ex-
pressed intention to override purely formalistic objections. Matter of Klat-
zI, 216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181 (1915); Matter of Farrand, 126 Misc. 590,
214 N. Y. Supp. 793 (Surr. Ct. 1926) ; cf. Matter of Horler, 180 App. Div.
609, 168 N. Y. Supp. 221 (1st Dep't 1917) (conveyance by wife to herself
and husband held to create joint tenancy on ground that requisite unities
were satisfied).
PATENTS-FEDERAL AND STATE JURISDICTION IN PATENT C,*sn.-SThe
defendants, the inventor and assignee of an unpatented massaging instru-
ment, employed the plaintiff to make the mechanical parts, the latter agree-
ing to keep confidential such information as would be disclosed thereby.
The defendants sued in a state court, alleging that the plaintiff had appro-
priated their ideas, had falsely claimed to be the inventor, and had obtained
a patent in his own name. Judgment was entered granting injunctive
relief and ordering the plaintiff as trustee ex maleficio to assign the patent.
On the ground that the state court was without jurisdiction, the plain-
tiff brought suit in the federal district court, inter alia, to enjoin the
state judgment. His complaint was dismissed. Held, on appeal (one judge
dizsenting), that the judgment be affirmed. Bec er v. Contoure Laboratories,
Inc., 29 F. (2d) 31 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
The federal Judicial Code provides that the jurisdiction vested in the
courts of the United States of all cases arising under the patent right
shall be exclusive of the courts of the several states. 36 STAT. 1160 (1911),
28 U. S. C. § 371 (1926). But the state courts clearly have jurisdiction
to determine the effect of the assignment of a patent, or other questions
not involving law peculiar to patents. 1 HOPKINS, PATENTS (1911) § 324;
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WALKER, PATENTS (5th ed. 1917) § 388; of. Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270
U. S. 496, 46 Sup. Ct. 397 (1926). The instant case seems to fall between
the categories, in that, while apparently arising out of the breach of the
agreement to keep secret and confidential, it also involves a dispute as
to priority in inventiveness directly bearing on the validity of the plain-
tiff's patent. Cf. Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U. S. 667, 9 Sup. Ct. 202 (1888).
Where the validity of a patent is only collaterally involved, the jurisdic-
tion of state courts has been upheld. David v. Park, 103 Mass. 501 (1870)
(action for deceit in sale of patent rights); Hanson v. Hall Mfg. Go.,
194 Iowa 1213, 190 N. W. 967 (1922) (counterclaim for slander by asser-
tion of infringement); Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Go., 168 U. S.
255, 18 Sup. Ct. 62 (1897). The instant decision would seem to extend
this jurisdiction to cover a dispute as to priority of inventiveness. Cf.
Rice v. Garnhart, 34 Wis. 453 (1874); Smith & Egge Mfg. Co. v. Webster,
87 Conn. 74, 86 Atl. 763 (1913). The Supreme Court seems to decide
jurisdiction largely on the form in which the plaintiff pleads his case.
See Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U. S. 479, 480, 35 Sup. Ct. 658,
659 (1915). 'But the defendants, in the instant case, as plaintiffs in the
state court, pleaded both the breach of the agreement and the question
of prior inventiveness. As a practical matter a workable adjustment must
be made in cases which might, with equal force, be held to invoke either
state or federal jurisdiction. It is true that the federal courts are as
a rule more competent to deal with patent questions, but since the inventor
obtained justice in the state court, to have required a retrial on a failure
of jurisdiction would have seemed unnecessarily to prolong litigation and
to foster technical defenses. But cf. Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa. 155 (1868) ;
Forster v. Brown Hoisting Machine Co., 266 Ill. 287, 107 N. E. 588 (1915) ;
Paul v. Collins, 191 Mich. 113, 157 N. W. 400 (1916).
POLICE POWER-PREVENTION OF DISEASE-POWER OF CITY JUDGE TO ORDER
BLOOD TEST.-The relator was arrested and charged with aiding and abet-
tirig prostitution. The trial was set for a future day and the city judge, as
required by statute, ordered that his blood test be taken, and that he be
detained in custody without bail pending its result. The relator, on com-
mitment to jail, applied for a writ of habeas corpus. Held, that the judge
had power and was under a duty to make such order. If the results proved
negative, the prisoner should then be admitted to bail. Writ quashed.
People v. Thomas, 231 N. Y. Supp. 271 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
The power of a board of health to impose a quarantine when necessary
is generally admitted. People v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422, 134 N. E. 815
(1922). (typhoid carrier need not be actually ill). But the exercise of
the power must be reasonable. Cf. Kirk v. Wyman, 83 S. C. 372, 65 S. t.
387 (1909) (gentlewoman, victim of antesthetic leprosy temporarily con-
fined at home; removal to pesthouse, located near city dump and formerly
used for incarceration of negrois with small-pox, unjustified). A legis-
lative act providing that prostitutes with venereal disease be confined
for treatment until cured has been held constitutional. Rx parte Brooks,
85 Tex. Cr. 397, 212 S. W. 956 (1919). There is confusion as to the
circumstances justifying examination and segregation of suspects. 01.
Ex parte Dayton, 52 Cal. App. 635, 199 Pac. 548 (1921) (prostitute rea-
sonably-suspected of infection, quarantine in jail justified). But of. Wragg
v. Gri.fn, 185 Iowa 243, 170 N. W. 400 (1919) (must be clear expression
of legislative intent to allow health board examination and detention of
one charged with lewdness); Ex parte Shepard, 51 Cal. App. 49, 195 Pac.
1077 -(1921) (mere suspicion insufficient to justify quarantine of one
arrested without warrant for keeping house of prostitution). Consent
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to an examination, by which disease is found, precludes successful applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground of arrest without a warrant.
Ex parte Johnston, 40 Cal. App. 242, 180 Pac. 644 (1919). Or on the
ground that the examination was procured through durezz when the judge
promise to dismiss the charge against the relator if she were found free
from disease. Application of Travcrs, 48 Cal. App. 764, 192 Pac. 454
(1920). The examination ordered by the court, as in the instant case,
rather than by a board of health, is a novel procedure, but seems justifiable
if there is reasonable cause for making the test. Cf. Ex parte Cowpany,
106 Ohio St. 50, 139 N. E. 204 (1922) (statutory authority to court does
not preclude similar power of health board to make examination).
PUBLIC UTILITIES-URISDICTION or RAILROAD Com issioN OvTR FOREIGN
CopoRATIoN-IssuAcE OF SEa Es.-The petitioner, a public service cor-
poration incorporated under the laws of Wyoming, distributed electrical
power in California. It applied in due form to the California Railroad
Commission for authority under the public utilities act of that state [Cal.
Laws 1925, c. 406] to issue $2,000,000 in preferred shares. Permission was
refused and the petitioner sought mandamus to compel authorization. Held,
that the Commission lacked jurisdiction. Writ denied. Southern Siciras
Power Co. v. R. R. Commission of California, 271 Pac. 747 (Cal. 1928).
Commission control of public utilities has been established in forty-seven
states, and in twenty-three of these authority has been conferred to regulate
the issuance of securities. See Waltersdorf, State Control of Utility
Capitalization (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 337, 338. This policy is based on
the necessity of avoiding the evils of overcapitalization in order to protect
and enforce the rights of both the consuming and investing public. The
instant case limits the commission's authority to domestic corporations on
the ground that the issuance of shares is an internal function to be regu-
lated only by the state creating the corporation. Accord: h? ,'e Fryeburg
Water Co., 79 N. H. 123, 106 Atl. 225 (1919); Re Suburban Scrrice Co,
P. U. R. 1924B 56 (Mo. 1923). It is possible that this rule best facili-
tates the issuance of securities by a corporation doing business in several
states. On the other hand, the opposite rule is adopted by sonme courts.
Peninsular Power Co. v. Sec. of State, 169 Mich. 595, 135 N. W. 650
(1912); kinneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. v. R. R. Cowimission, 13 Wis.
47, 197 N. W. 352 (1924); Re Twin State Gas and Electric Co., P. U. R.
1925E 799 (Vt. 1925). And, of course, where the federal government
through the Interstate Commerce Commission regulates the issuance of
securities by railroads it is excluding control by the state of incorporation.
Cf. Pittsburgh & W. V. Ry. v. L C. C., 293 Fed. 1001 (Ct of App. D. C.
1923). The position taken by the instant court that the issuance of sharcs
is an internal function may be seriously questioned. Minneapols, St. P.
& S. S. M. Ry. v. R. R. Commission, supra; cf. Kraft v. Griffon Co., 82
App. Div. 29, 81 N. Y. Supp. 438 (1st Dep't 1903) (illegal stock issue by
foreign corporation enjoined); London, Paris & Amer. Bank v. Aronrtci-,
117 Fed. 601 (C. C. A. 9th, 1902) (local laws as to stock transfer applicable
to foreign corporation). But irrespective of what the courts may term the
issuance of securities, it would seem that, by denying the Commission this
control over a foreign corporation doing extensive public business within
the state, the fulfillment of the policy behind the regulation is to a large
extent impeded. See Rosenbaum and Lilienthal, Issuance of Sceuritics by
Public Service Corporations (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 716, 725.
.ToRTS-VOLATiON OF MOTOR VEHICLE O'0aAToRs LICENs% STATtTE AS
BAR TO RECOVERY FOR INxuRmis.-A statute provided that "no person shall
operate a motor vehicle upon any way in this state unless licensed." N.
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H. Laws 1926, c. 101, § 9. The plaintiff, driving an automobile with-
out the required operator's license, collided with the defendant's train at a
level highway crossing. In a suit for damages the plaintiff was non-suited.
Held, on a bill of exception, that the plaintiff's violation of the statute pre-
cluded recovery. Exception overruled. Johnson v. Boston & Me. R. R.,
143 Atl. 516 (N. H. 1928).
A Connecticut statute expressly provides for the result reached in the
instant case. Conn. Acts 1921, c. 400 § 61; Salt's Mfg. Co. v. Ghent, 107
Conn. 211, 139 Atl. 694 (1928). But neither the failure to endorse the opera-
tor's name on the license, nor the failure to carry the license, as required by
the. statute, puts the offender in the class of an unlicensed operator. Cusadk
v. Williams Laube & Co., 104 Conn. 454, 133 Atl. 584 (1926); Kiely V.
Rogali, 93 Conn. 454, 106 Atl. 502 (1919). In Massachusetts an
unregistered vehicle is a trespasser on the highway, and its owner can
recover only for wanton and wilful injuries. Dudley v. North Hampton
St. Ry., 202 Mass. 443, 89 N. E. 25 (1909) ; Holland v. City of Boston, 213
Mass. 560, 100 N. E. 1009 (1913); (1928) _37 YALE L. J. 393. But Massa-
chusetts has refused to extend that doctrine to unlicensed operators. Bourne
v. Whitman, 209 Mass. 155, 95 N. E. 404 (1911). Many cases, without dis-
cussing the purpose of license statutes, hold that an unlicensed operator is
not precluded from recovering for injuries, for the violation of the statute
is said not to be the "proximate cause" of the injury. Southern Ry. v.
Vaughn's Adm'r, 118 Va. 692, 88 S. E. 305 (1916); Page v. Mayors, 191
Cal. 263, 216 Pac. 31 (1923); see Notes (1922) 16 A. L. R. 1113; (1925)
35 A. L. R. 65. On similar reasoning recovery has been allowed, even where
it was conceded that the sole purpose of the operator's license statute was
for the safety of the traveling public. See Moore v. Hart, 171 Ky. 725, 732,
188 S. W. 861, 864 (1916). And recovery has been allowed on the ground
that failure to obtain the license was "not contributory negligence affecting
the case." See Speight v. Simonson, 115 Ore. 618, 239 Pac. 542 (1925).
In the instant case it seems that the court properly concluded that no
questions of contributory negligence or of causation were involved, and that
the vital question to be determined was the purpose of the stutute. It
is submitted, however, that a construction which denies to a violator of
the statute redress for injuries negligently caused by another, may be im-
posing a penalty far in excess of that intended by the legislature.
TRUSTS-TERMINATION BY SOLE CESTUI-RULE OF CLAFLIN V. CLAFLIN.-
A devised one-fourth of his estate in trust to pay the income to his son B
for life, and then in trust for the "education and reasonable maintenance"
of any child or grandchild of B living at his death, for twenty years, after
which the share was to vest absolutely in these children. If B left no chil-
dren or grandchildren the share was to be held in trust for B's heirs for
twenty years after the death of the survivor of B and his sister C. B died
thirty years later, never having married, and C became his sole heir. C
was then sixty-two years of age, without issue or other kin. C claimed the
one-fourth share free of the trust. The court decreed that the trustees
should hold for twenty years from the death of C, and then pay to B's heirs
at that time, C to receive for life sufficient for "reasonable maintenance."*
Held, on appeal (one judge dissenting on the ground that the heirs should
be determined at B's death), that the decree be affirmed. Sutton v. Safe.
Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore, 142 Atl. 627 (Md. 1928).
Where there is a gift over after a life estate to the heirs of the life ten-
ant, they are to be determined'at his death. Blass v. Helms, 93 Terin, 166,
.23 S. W. 138 (1893); PAGE, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) § 927; KALES, FUTURE IN-
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TEREsT (2d ed. 1920) §§ 563 et seq. If this general rule is regardcd, the
accidental result of the limitation in the instant case is that there is a sole
beneficiary, but her enjoyment is postponed until twenty years after her
death, an anomalous situation. Some jurisdictions, including Maryland,
follow the so-called Claflin rule, and will not terminate a trust before the
stipulated time, even though the cestui has the entire beneficial interest and
there are no limitations over. Claflin ,. Claflin, 149 Mas. 19, 20 N. E. 454
(1889) ; Gunn v. Brown & Brawn, 63 Md. 96 (1885) ; Evans, Tc;,nzination of
Trsts (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1070, 1076, 1080. But no one may object if the
trustee turns the property over to the cestui. Lcmcn v. MeComnas & Dow-
ney, 63 Md. 153 (1885); TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (1920) 432. The strict
application of the Claflin rule would lead to the surprising result of the
instant ease. It would prevent the enjoyment of the corpus by the only
surviving member of the class intended to take-the testator's lineal de-
scendants. Some courts that follow the Claflin rule might evade this result
by applying an exception where unforeseen events make its application do
violence to the settlor's obvious intent. Welch v. Trustee of Epk-eopal
School, 189 Mass. 108, 75 N. E. 139 (1905); Bennett r. Nashrille Trust Co.,
127 Tenn. 126, 153 S. W. 840 (1913); cf. Black v. Bailcy, 142 Ark. 201, 218
S. W. 210 (1920). But this exception defeats the spirit of the rule, based
as it is entirely on the intention of the settlor as expressed in the creating
instrument. The difficulty of applying the Claflin rule to this situation
strengthens the arguments for the English doctrine, which permits a ter-
mination at the request of the sole cestui when his interest is vested and
merely the enjoyment postponed. Scott, Control of Property by the Dcad
(1917) 65 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 527, 632, 647-650; Gmw, RuLm A AI NsT PE.-
P-rurrms (3d ed. 1915) §§ 118-121 (j).
TRUSTS-WILL ANNEXED To DEED OF TRusT-REVOcABmTY.The settlor,
under a voluntary deed of trust without provision for revocation, trans-
ferred to the plaintiff bank, as trustee, certain personal property. He was
to have the income for life and the corpus was to be transferred to the
executors named in his "will," who were to hold this as well as the residue
of his personal property on trust for his wife and children. The "will"
-was made part of the deed of trust and named the plaintiff as executor. He
subsequently made a new will, revoking the prior "will," leaving all his
personal property to the defendant, his wife, and naming her executrix.
Held, that the "writing," i. c., the "will," annexed to the deed of trust was
irrevocable. Hamilton Trust Co. r. Baa ford, 141 AtI. 207 (N. J. Eq. 1928).
As a general rule a perfectly created trust, in the absence of mistake,
fraud or undue influence, is irrevocable, even though voluntary, unless such
power is reserved in the instrument. BOGERT, TRUSTS (1921) § 72. The
rule has been carried so far as to forbid the settlor to modify the terms
after the complete creation of the trust. Gulicl: r. Gulic, 39 N. J. Eq. 401
(1885). Nor can he alter them by will. Dickci-son'.r Appeal, 115 Pa. 198,
8 At]. 64 (1887). But when the terms of the trust are to be afterwards de-
clared by will, the will hiay be revoked. Ma1 yor and City Council of Balti-
maore v. Williams, 6 Md. 235 (1854). If no rights have been vested in third
persons, it is submitted that the relationship between the settlor and the
trustee is substantially a means for managing the settlor's property, and
should, therefore, be revocable by the settlor at his pleasure. See Evans,
Termination of Trusts (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1070, 1071; cf. Schrirr r.
Frozrzel, 179 Ky. 228, 200 S. W. 327 (1918). Objectively considered, the
relationship is closely analogous to that of principal and agent. The courts
have reached a conclusion which seems unduly harsh on the settlor in
applying the general rule to cases where the settlor is the sole beneficiary.
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Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co., 195 Mass. 575, 81 N. E. -300 (1907),. O
jurisdiction, at least, has sought to avoid the doctrine by the presumption.
of mistake where the power of revocation is omitted. Aylsworth v. Widt-
comb, 12 R. I. 298 (1879). And it is everywhere recognized that a spond,
thrift trust for the benefit of the settlor is void as to creditors. Schonk v,
Barnes, 156 N. Y. 316, 50 N. E. 967 (1898). Moreover, a trust will not
be continued for the benefit of the trustee alone. Eakle v. Ingram, 142 Cal.
15, 75 Pac. 566 (1904). In New York, by statute, revocation of a trust of
personal property is allowed upon written consent of all persons beneficially
interested. N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (1917) § 23; of. Whittcmore
v. Equitable Trust Co., 162 App. Div. 607, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1058 (1st Dep't
1914) (trust for benefit of settler for life, remainder, if any, to next of
kin: revocable by settler without consent of next of kin). But when, as in
the instant casq, rights have been vested in third parties, there would seem
to be ample justification for holding the trust irrevocable. Ex Parte Pye,
18 Ves. 140 (1811) ; McElveen v. Adams, 108 S. C. 437, 94 S. E. 733 (1917) ;
Fidelity Title and Trust Co. v. Graham, 262 Pa. 273, 105 Atl. 295 (1918).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-SUBROGATION TO EMPLOYER'S RIGHTS AGAINST
THIRD PAnTis.-The defendant, a builder, furnished negligently con-
structed staging to his subcontractor, which cause the death of one of the
latter's employees. Compensation was awarded the dependents of the
deceased, and the plaintiff, subcontractor's insurer, paid several instalments.
The plaintiff brought suit under a workmen's compensation statute provid-
ing that after compensation the employer or his insurer be subrogated to
the rights of the employee against any responsible third party. VT. GEN.
LAwS (1917) §§ 5775, 5758. The plaintiff had a judgment for damages,
Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed. Travelers' Ins. Co. v,.
Evans, 143 At. 290 (Vt. 1928).
In absence of statute neither employer nor insurer is subrogated to claims
of the injured employee against a third party whose tortious act caused
the injury for which compensation was awarded. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co. v. Englander, 93 N. J. Eq. 188, 118 At]. 628 (1921) ; Hender
son Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Owensboro Home Tel. & Tel. Co., 192 Ky. 322, 233 S.
W. 743 (1921). To prevent double recovery by the employee, most conmpen,
sation acts provide for an assignment to the employer or insurer, or for
subrogation. See HILL & WILKINS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTE LAW
(1923). The amount of the recovery is limited in some statutes to the
compensation awarded. Bauer v. Rusetos & Co., 306 Ill. 602, 138 N. E. 206
(1923). Whether, under such statutes, recovery can be had for coin-
pensation which has been awarded but is not yet due, is uncertain. Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Cincinnati C. C. & St. L. By., 124 N. E. 774 (Ind. App,
1919) (limited to sum already paid); Bauer v. Rusetos & Co., supra (full
amount of award). Where the statute does not provide for the amount of
recovery, interpretations vary. Albrecht Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Iron
Works, 200 Mich. 109, 166 N. W. 855 (1918) (recovery limited to amount
paid out in compensation); Travelers' Ins. Co. v. B~ass Goods Mfg. Co,, 239
N. Y. 273, 146 N. E. 377 (1925) (amount injured employee could have
recovered in tort). The greater number of statutes expressly provide, as
in the instant case, that the full damage to the injured employee can be
recovered, any excess recovered above the amount of compensation being
payable to said employee. See HMIL & WILKINS, op. cit. supra; Southern Ry.
v. U. S. Casualty Co., 136 Va. 475, 118 S. E. 266 (1923). Cases involving
wrongful death, while presenting some difficulties of theory, have generally
been treated as subject to the same rules of recovery. Travelers' Ins. Co. v.
Louis Padula Co., 224 N. Y. 397, 121 N. E. 348 (1918) ; F idellty & Casualty
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Co. v. Huse & Carleton, 254 Mass. 359, 150 N. E. 230 (1926). And con-
curring negligence on the part of the employer has been held invalid as a
defense by the tortfeasor. Otis Elevator Co. v. Miller & Paine, 240 Fed.
376 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917). The theory seems to be that the compenation
acts are designed to affect the status of employer and employee, not to limit
the responsibility in tort of third persons. But it has been held that an
insurance company which has paid compensation to an injured employee of
a subcontractor cannot maintain an action against the negligent general
contractor if the latter has accepted the provisions of the act. White v.
George B. H. Macomber Co., 244 Mass. 195, 138 N. D. 239 (1923).
